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I. INTRODUCTION 
A defining characteristic of all communities, whether families, 
tribes, guilds, firms, universities, unions, municipalities or states, 
* Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. This is the revised version of a paper 
presented by the author at the 24th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer 
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is the strength and nature of the relationships between their 
members. Whether these relationships are based on kinship, 
religious connection, language, mutual economic interest, social 
class, political affiliation or cultural heritage, whether they are 
organized hierarchically or polycentrically, it is fair to say that we 
expect them to be richer, more permanent and more deeply 
imbedded within the identities of the members of these commu- 
nities than are the relationships among members of different 
communities. 
The Canadian identity, because of needs generated by a 
relatively small population, vast territory, dual languages and 
immigrant heritage, has been defined by the strength and integrity 
of our relationships with one another as Canadians. Unlike many 
other nations, we have not defined ourselves as a nation of 
atomistic individuals, we do not have international ambitions or 
symbols of international supremacy to draw us together. It is the 
strength and depth of the internal relations among Canadians 
which explain why, as Canadians, we respond to the needs of 
fishers in Newfoundland when the fishery collapses; why we 
respond to the needs of farming communities in the Prairies in the 
face of crop devastation or collapsing international commodity 
markets; why we support the development of Northern commu- 
nities; why one of our most important national symbols is repre- 
sented by our sharing of health and medical costs; why we support 
the preservation and enhancement of the distinctiveness of 
Quebec culture and language; why we support economic 
transition strategies in Ontario in the face of changing trade 
relations; and it is why we struggle with issues of diversity and 
multi-culturalism in Canada perhaps more than any other country 
in the world. 
The premise of this article on the current status of the Canadian 
economic union and the meaning of the Internal Trade 
Agreement (the "Agreement") on that union, is that the union 
describes the economic relations among individual Canadians. 
The union is not comprised of the interconnections among 
political jurisdictions. The Canadian economic union, when 
conceived as the product of the relations between individual 
Canadians, is the market. We have decided that our material well- 
being as individuals and as a community is best served by decen- 
tralizing economic power and thereby permitting individuals, 
whether alone or in groups, to act relatively autonomously in 
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deciding when, with whom and how they should arrange their 
affairs in an effort to achieve self-defined goals. The essential 
nature of the Canadian economic union is one of untold millions of 
privately arranged economic market relations - subject to 
regulation, of course, but nonetheless defined by private firms and 
individuals. 
Depending on the context, relatively discrete and identifiable 
markets will develop within neighbourhoods, within urban areas, 
between urban areas and rural hinterlands, between remote 
resource communities and international buyers, and within 
relatively large geographic regions - ultimately, some markets in 
Canada will be national in scope and in many cases the Canadian 
market will form part of a larger international market. Thus the 
Canadian economic union consists of numbers of individual 
relations which, in a unitary state and without redistributive 
policies, would be arranged according to a pattern which 
individuals believe would maximize their personal welfare as 
Canadians. 
In the absence of governmental policies (whether developed at 
the federal or provincial level) intended to benefit particular 
individuals within specific regions within Canada, the scope and 
scale of market relations within Canada should and will be defined 
and shaped by population densities, the presence or absence of 
biophysical resources, by communication and transportation 
infrastructures, by the availability of capital, by the comparative 
advantage of the persons comprising particular communities 
within Canada, and by geography and weather. The Canadian 
economic union -with whom one trades, when, on what terms 
and under what conditions - will be defined by private individuals 
and firms seeking to increase or maximize their respective wealth 
or welfare subject only to those "natural" constraints which will 
produce markets, determine their shape and scale, or in some 
instances preclude their development. The Canadian economic 
union is, in that sense, the product of individual Canadians trading 
with one other. The "union" is the absence of the state beyond its 
role in the recognition of property rights, in providing for the 
enforceability of contracts, and in correcting for market failures 
should they occur.' 
1 The ultimate shape of the Canadian social, cultural and political union will, of course, be 
determined by important redistributive policies - both through direct and indirect 
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However, as a federal state, the scope and scale of the Canadian 
economic union are also defined by the political boundaries of 
Confederation which were established without regard to the then 
existing, let alone the present, configuration of markets in 
Canada. We have decided, for good or bad, to establish sovereign 
provinces with authority to legislate with respect to exchange 
relations - contract, property and trade - within the province. 
Constitutional decisions, almost from the time of Confederation, 
have vested a considerable portion of potential regulatory 
authority over markets in provincial governments. The result is a 
fragmentation of markets which would otherwise be organized 
without regard to provincial b~unda r i e s .~  We are thus confronted 
with one of the essential dilemmas of federalism - when should 
economic relations exist, be defined or be regulated at the national 
level, and at the level of subnational political units. In the absence 
of pressing arguments in favour of market fragmentation, it is my 
position that national markets - which will include many, 
although not all, aspects of transportation services; communi- 
cation services; investment and financial services; the creation, 
distribution and supply of energy and natural resources; and so on 
-call for definition and regulation at the national level. The other 
side of this position is held by "provincialists" -those who argue 
that the federal government itself will engage in market- 
fragmenting and market-distorting policies; that local govern- 
ments can engage in public policy formation which is much more 
sensitive to local welfare; and that provincial trade barriers and 
protectionist strategies can be addressed, ex post, through 
voluntary provincial agreemenk3 
The current debate concerning the Canadian economic union 
began in the early-1980s negotiations leading up to the constitu- 
tional amendments of 1982. In 1983 the Ontario Economic 
Council published Federalism and the Canadian Economic 
U n i ~ n , ~  a collection of essays edited by Professors Trebilcock, 
taxation and through social welfare programs. However, the economic union is the 
marketplace. 
See P . * ~ o n a h a n ,  "At Doctrine's Twilight; The Structure of Canadian Federalism" 
(19841.34 U.T.L.J. 47. 
3 see   flatters and R.J. Lipsey, "Common Ground for the Common Market", Essays in 
International Economics (Instit. Res. Pub. Pol., 1983). 
M.J. Trebilcock, J.R.S. Prichard, T.J. Courchen, J. Walley eds. (Toronto, U. of T. Press, 
1983). See also, A.E. Safarian, Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration, constitu- 
tional study prepared for the Government of Canada (1973); The Honourable Jean 
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Prichard, Courchene and Whalley in which the authors addressed 
that central question - which level of government should have 
authority over which economic activities - which defines 
Canadian economic federalism. That collection initiated a decade- 
long debate about which level of government was responsible for 
distortions in the Canadian common market, about the magnitude 
and distribution of the welfare losses associated with trade 
barriers, and about the most appropriate political response to the 
fragmentation of the Canadian marketplace. I am not going to 
repeat any of what was said then -my sense of the literature is 
that not much has been added to the very perceptive analyses 
(descriptive, empirical and theoretical) contained in that 
c~l lect ion.~ 
In July 1994 - more than ten years after this seminal series of 
essays was written - the federal government, ten provinces and 
two territories signed what is referred to as the Agreement on 
Internal Trade. The Agreement is presented as an almost mythic 
"voluntary agreement" symbolizing the ability of ten provinces 
and the federal government to work co-operatively to further the 
national good.6 It attempts to bring Canada together; to re-orient 
Canada on its historical EasttWest axis. However, I argue in this 
essay that the symbolism of the Internal Trade Agreement, while 
important, is not enough. The substance of the Agreement offers 
Canadians, as they define their economic relations with each other 
within Canada, substantially less than international trade agree- 
ments offer Canadians as they define their economic relations with 
foreign firms and citizens. I also attempt to explain how and why 
Chretien, Minister of Justice, Securing the Canadian Economic Union in the Constitution, 
discussion paper published by the Government of Canada (1980); Frank Flatters and R.J. 
Lipsey, supra, footnote 3. 
5 For more recent work, see William B.P. Robson, Dynamic Tensions, Markets, Federalism 
and Canada's Economic Future: Policy Review and Outlook (C.D. Howe Institute, 1992); 
J. Quinn, "Federalism and Foreign Economic Relations" (1985), 10 Can.-U.S. L.J. 197; 
Perspectives on the Canadian Economic Union, Mark Krasnick, ed., Vol. 60, Royal 
Commission on the Ewnomic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto, 
U. of T. Press, 1986); R. Broadway, The Constitutional Division of Powers: An Economic 
Perspective (Ewnomic Council of Canada, 1992). 
6The Agreement was presented by the federal government and the then Liberal 
government in Quebec as evidence of the "new" flexible federalism which offered 
increased autonomy for Quebec as part of Canada. Perversely, however, the Agreement 
may represent a nascent international economic trade agreement should Quebec sover- 
eigntists succeed in their quest to establish an independent Quebec state in North 
America. 
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this came about - the explanation is linked to economic, political 
and constitutional events which cannot be separated from the 
issue of internal trade. 
II. THE INTERNAL TRADE AGREEMENT - A N  OVERVIEW 
The core of the Agreement is contained in the following 
principles. First, the provinces agreed to a general "Reciprocal 
Non-Discrimination" principle - provinces must accord to goods, 
services, persons and investments of other provinces no less 
favourable treatment than they accord to their own goods, 
services, persons and investments. Second, the provinces agreed 
to recognize the right of exit and entry - provinces may not adopt 
any measures that restrict or prevent the movement of persons, 
goods, services or investments across provincial boundaries. 
Third, the provinces agreed that provincial regulatory measures 
will not operate to create obstacles to inter-provincial trade. 
Fourth, the provinces agreed that these trade liberalization 
principles would be subject to exceptions for legitimate provincial 
objectives. That is, regulatory measures inconsistent with the 
above principles are permissible if the purpose of the measure is to 
achieve legitimate objectives that are not unduly restrictive. Legit- 
imate objectives include the pursuit of public security and safety, 
public order, protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
protection of the environment, consumer protection, protection 
of the health and well-being of workers and affirmative action 
programs. Fifth, the parties agreed to a set of non-judicial dispute 
resolution measures and to continue negotiations in respect of 
those components of the agreement which were not concluded. 
Ill. T W O  COMPETING VISIONS OF THE INTERNAL TRADE 
AGREEMENT 
The meaning of the Internal Trade Agreement can best be 
understood in the telling of two very different stories - one told 
by a nationalist, the other by a provincialist. The reader can 
choose for herself or himself which one accords with one's sense of 
the reality of Canada; which of the two stories describes a nation. 
The nationalist story begins with the assertion that the 
Agreement confirms the primacy of the Canadian economic 
union. The Agreement is evidence that there is no necessary or 
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logical inconsistency between the extreme provincial political 
sovereignty which characterizes Canadian federalism and the 
achievement of a high degree of economic integration. The 
Agreement confirms that autonomous provinces can voluntarily 
come together to negotiate a multi-lateral arrangement which will 
respond effectively to market fragmentation, destructive compe- 
tition for investment, excessive enforcement and compliance costs 
and duplication in program delivery. Moreover, the nationalist 
would view the Agreement as merely the starting point in the 
process of voluntary, multi-lateral reconciliation and reduction of 
trade barriers, and the nationalist would identify a number of 
weaknesses in the Agreement which demand further action. 
First, the Agreement is directed primarily at preventing the 
introduction of new barriers to trade. The fundamental principle 
which defines the Agreement is not the elimination of existing 
barriers to trade, but rather merely a commitment in Article 102' 
that the provinces will not establish new barriers to internal trade. 
While other very important fundamental principles affirm "equal 
treatment" of goods, services, people and investment and 
recognize that provinces will reconcile conflicting standards, the 
Agreement is fundamentally flawed in its failure to impose or 
recognize any fundamental obligation to eliminate existing 
barriers to trade. 
Second, the Agreement fails to attend to the issue of duplication 
of services between the federal and provincial governments. The 
scope of the Agreement confirms the critical need for further 
agreements to address the costs of multi-provincial regulatory 
activity, as well as the increasing competitive costs of government 
procurement and related incentive programs. The categories of 
trade barriers addressed in the agreement - non-tariff standard 
barriers, government procurement policies, local presence and 
residency requirements for investment, labour mobility, 
consumer-related measures and standards, agricultural and food 
goods, alcoholic beverages, natural resources, transportation, 
incentive programs and environmental protection - overwhelm- 
ingly illustrate the breadth of the trade-distorting barriers that 
- 
~ r t z e  102(3) provides that the provinces, in the application of the Agreement, shall be 
guided by a number of principles, including Article 102(3)(a), which mandates that the 
provinces "will not establish new bamers to internal trade and will facilitate the cross- 
boundary movement of persons, goods, services and investments within Canada". 
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have been developed over decades by both federal and provincial 
governments. However, in many of these areas, the Agreement 
merely establishes processes and structures for future negotiations 
which may (or may not) provide for specific measures designed to 
reduce or eliminate provincial trade barriers and other protec- 
tionist strategies. 
A third concern of nationalists is the erosion of the principle of 
internal free trade through a myriad of exceptions to free trade 
principles which permeate the Agreement. This underlying 
weakness of the Agreement is best illustrated by Article 102.4: 
4. In applying the principles set out in paragraph 3, the Parties recognize: 
(a) the need for full disclosure of information, legislation, regulations, 
policies and practices that have the potential to impede an open, 
efficient and stable domestic market; 
(b) the need for exceptions and transition periods; 
(c) the need for exceptions required to meet regional development 
objectives in Canada; 
(d) the need for supporting administrative, dispute settlement and 
compliance mechanisms that are accessible, timely, credible and 
effective; and 
(e) the need to take into account the importance of environmental 
objectives, consumer protection and labour standards. 
In the result, three of the five interpretative guidelines support the 
continuation of trade barriers - even at the outset the parties 
recognize the need for exceptions to free trade principles, the need 
for exceptions to meet regional development objectives and the 
need to take into account environmental, consumer protection 
and labour standards. 
A fourth concern of economic nationalists is the Agreement's 
inadequate treatment of government procurement policies. While 
chapter 5 of the Agreement, which deals with procurement 
policies, includes its own fundamental "reciprocal non-discrimina- 
tion" provision, Article 504, which specifically refers to equal 
treatment and most favoured province treatment of construction 
contractors, operates so as to exclude a substantial number of 
Crown corporations, municipal corporations and other privatel- 
public enterprises  from the  Agreement's procurement 
provisions.* Given the economic, social and political significance 
8See Internal Trade Agreement at pp. 65-83. However, it should be noted that the 
Agreement includes a commitment to further negotiations to extend the Agreement to 
these entities (Article 502.4). 
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of these institutions to the Canadian political economy, their 
exclusion substantially weakens the force of the Agreement. 
Moreover, their exclusion suggests that governments have a 
relatively simple mechanism to introduce new trade barriers in the 
future. More significantly, Article 508 provides for the indefinite 
continuation of regional and economic development programs 
which are exempt from the procurement provisions of the 
Agreement so long as provinces list the programs, prepare an 
annual written report on program operations, and conduct a 
review of the programs by 1998 in light of their regional and 
economic development objectives. Finally, the Agreement 
excludes "intra-governmental" contracts entirely from the 
operation of the procurement regulations. 
Fifth, the trade-off between efficient national markets and the 
preservation of provincial political sovereignty is manifest in two 
particular provisions of the Agreement. Article 301 provides that 
nothing in the Agreement alters the legislative authority of the 
provinces - of course, no contractual agreement could preclude 
provinces from exercising their constitutional powers to alter the 
provisions of the Agreement   nil ate rally.^ More specifically, 
Article 404 of the Agreement permits provincial governments to 
depart from fundamental equal treatment obligations where they 
are pursuing "legitimate provincial objectives": 
Where it is established that a measure is inconsistent with Article 401, 
Article 402 or 403, that measure is still permissible under this Agreement 
where it can be demonstrated that: 
(a) the purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective; 
(b) the measure does not operate to impair unduly the access of 
persons, goods, services or investments of a Party that meet that 
legitimate objective; 
(c) the measure is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve 
that legitimate objective; and 
(d) the measure does not create a disguised restriction on trade. 
As a result, provinces may depart from the non-protectionist 
directive in Article 401 simply by demonstrating that the purpose 
(and not the effect) of a regulatory measure is to achieve a 
provincial "legitimate objective". Legitimate objectives, defined 
9 This exclusion emphasizes the inherent limitation of using a contractual vehicle to address 
provincial trade barriers, as compared to earlier initiatives which would have constitution- 
alized the limitations on provincial authority to enact legislation affecting inter-provincial 
trade. 
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in Article 201, encompass virtually all significant areas of 
provincial regulatory jurisdiction - public safety, public order, 
protection of human, animal or plant life, protection of the 
environment, consumer protection, protection of the health, 
safety and well being of workers, and affirmative action programs 
for disadvantaged groups. Moreover, Annex 405.2 provides that 
provinces may adopt and maintain regulatory measures which 
they "consider . . . appropriate" to achieve a legitimate objective. 
The combination of these provisions means that provinces are free 
to engage in a broad range of regulatory policies unencumbered by 
restraints imposed under the Internal Trade Agreement. 
In addition, the Agreement contains an array of exceptions 
which will result in continuing trade distortions. The exceptions 
include : 
(a) energy goods and energy services;lO 
(b) restrictions relating to occupational qualifications;ll 
(c) procurement practices by a substantial number of 
government-related agencies and procurement 
practices relating to regional and economic devel- 
opment purposes;12 
(d) economic incentives which do not "directly" result in 
an enterprise relocating outside a province;l3 
(e) restrictions on labour mobility which relate to social 
policy measures,14 or which are designed to achieve 
legitimate objectives including "labour market 
development";l5 
(f) consumer measures to achieve legitimate objectives 
which, in this context, include the promotion of 
economic interests16 as well as the physical safety of 
consumers;l7 
lo The chapter of the Agreement dealing with energy simply states that energy will be the 
subject of future negotiations envisioned in Article 1810. 
11 See Article 709. 
12 Article 508. 
13 See Annex 608.3(4). 
l4 Social policy measures include, but are not limited to, different labour standards and 
codes, minimum wages, unemployment insurance qualification periods and social assis- 
tance benefits. 
15 See Article 709. Other legitimate objectives of labour policy include such broad 
categories as public security, public order, protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, protection of the environment, consumer protection, worker safety, affirmative 
action programs, and provision of adequate social and health services to all geographic 
regions of a province. 
16 See Article 810. Economic interests are defined in extremely broad terms and include, 
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(g) supply-side management programs18 and other non- 
technical trade barriers applicable to agricultural 
products; 
(h) a broad range of barriers, both bilateral and multi- 
lateral, relating to the wine and beer industry;lg 
(i) management programs relating to natural resources 
including fisheries, forestry, water and mineral 
resources;m 
(j) measures respecting culture or cultural i ndus t r i e~ ;~~  
(k) the regulation of financial institutions and financial 
services ;22 
(1) a range of regional economic development programs 
which do not "unduly" impair access of persons, 
goods, services or investments of another province;23 
and 
(m) a range of regulatory requirements applicable to the 
transportation sector.24 
Various arguments have been offered to support these diver- 
sions from the pursuit of the Canadian economic union. First, the 
provinces argue that provincial sovereignty permits, indeed 
encourages, regulatory experimentation and competition which 
produce benefits which exceed those associated with the reduction 
or elimination of trade restrictions. However, there is consid- 
erable evidence that trade restrictions unequivocally reduce 
aggregate national economic well-being. Proponents of the 
benefits of inter-provincial regulatory competition should be 
required to demonstrate the economic benefits associated with 
that position. Moreover, regulatory experimentation can be 
but are not limited to, quality of goods, services and suppliers, information disclosure 
about the goods, services and suppliers, contractual fairness, access to redress mecha- 
nisms, security of consumer deposits, prevention of unfair trade practices and protection 
of privacy. 
17 Ibid. 
l8 Indeed, Article 902 obliges the parties to implement an action plan towards the devel- 
opment of sustainable orderly marketing systems in the Canadian dairy, poultry and egg 
industries. 
l9 See Chapter 10 of the Agreement. 
20 See Article 1102. 
21 See Article 1802. 
" Article 1807 excludes measures adopted by governments or agencies which exercise 
regulatory jurisdiction in relation to financial institutions or financial services. 
23 See Article 1802, "Regional Economic Development". 
See Annex 1410.1. 
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achieved by a resourceful federal government willing to 
implement trial policies at the regional or local level. Finally, the 
potential benefits of regulatory competition cannot justify the 
wholesale exclusion of broad economic sectors from the 
Agreement's ambit. 
A second argument favouring broad exceptions from the 
Agreement focuses on the diversity of social and cultural values 
within Canada - regulatory policies which maximize aggregate 
social welfare in British Columbia or New Brunswick may not 
achieve that end in Saskatchewan or Quebec. While that position 
may explain some exceptions (in particular, exceptions for 
cultural industries), assertions of provincial social and cultural 
diversity fail to explain or justify differing provincial regulatory 
polices in areas such as communications, investment, regional 
development, financial services, government procurement and so 
on. I think we make far too much of the argument that social 
welfare will be maximized through decentralized policies which 
ensure that local public goods, like consumer protection, are 
designed and delivered at the local leve1.25 It may very well be that 
local tastes are simply not as distinct as local and provincial politi- 
cians would have us believe them to be. Countries as diverse as 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy, with consumer markets at 
least as sophisticated as Canada's and with populations two, three 
and four times as large, prosper without multiple consumer 
protection regimes.26 
In the end, the Internal Trade Agreement, the nationalist would 
argue, is an important starting point in the incremental, voluntary 
reconciliation of trade barriers among provinces. While it is a 
unique and critical opening move in building a new economic 
partnership among provinces, it does not go nearly far enough. 
See A. Breton and A. Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (Toronto, U. of 
T. Press. 1978). 
26If there' is an argument for local regulation of consumer markets, it exists at the 
community or urban level. There are certainly many consumer markets which are quite 
local in nature and where relevant information which would be necessary for regulation 
can only be efficiently obtained at the local level. Local regulation in the consumer 
context would, with few exceptions not likely result in significant trade barriers. 
Producer interests could not effectively organize at this level of politics. In many cases, 
even if producer organizational costs were relatively low, the benefits of the trade barrier 
would be even lower. Finally, few local communities would be able to exercise sufficient 
leverage, in light of the opportunity costs of excluding entry, to adopt exclusionary 
regulatory policies affecting consumer goods. 
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A second, very different story is told by a provincialist who 
argues that the Agreement goes much too far in obliging provinces 
to pursue national trade objectives and to further national 
economic interests, when the appropriate role for the provinces is 
the pursuit of measures to serve the legitimate, albeit narrower, 
social interests of their local populations. Provincialists favour 
inter-provincial competition and argue that those who do not 
consider themselves better off under particular provincial regimes 
can exercise a much more effective political voice at the provincial 
level than they could federally, or can simply "vote with their 
feet" and choose a more attractive set of provincial policies.27 
As well, provincialists argue that the Agreement is inadequate 
to protect local and provincial interests - provincialists take the 
position that measures which are designed to benefit local 
consumers should not be subject to any constraints which, while 
potentially increasing overall economic well-being in Canada, 
would almost certainly result in a net loss to local residents. The 
nature of federalism is that only the provinces can and should 
address local demands which cannot be effectively communicated 
or received at the federal level of government. Many regulatory 
measures, especially in provinces outside of the traditional 
manufacturing base in central Canada, are intended to address 
their significant imbalance in economic and political power 
relative to the "centre". In the absence of strong federal 
regulatory intervention, provinces must be able to pursue 
regulatory agendas which attempt to redress the concentration of 
economic power in Ontario and Quebec. 
A third concern of provincialists is that the Internal Trade 
Agreement will have a chilling effect on regulatory action at the 
provincial level. The expected benefits of much regulatory inter- 
vention, such as environmental and consumer protection 
27 The view of provincialists toward the document is unlikely to be totally negative. In 
particular, the Agreement applies to the activities of the federal level of government. 
This inclusion addresses long-standing complaints of several provinces that certain 
federal government market-distorting policies enacted in the name of the "national 
interest" have, in reality, been motivated by regional interests acting within the federal 
government to pursue transfers of wealth from one region to another. In addition, 
provincialists argue that the Agreement achieves an admirable balance between the 
efficiencies of national markets and the needs of local communities. They would argue 
that the "legitimate objectives" exceptions are vital in order to protect values which 
cannot be calculated in economic terms - including concerns with the distribution of 
wealth among provincial residents, the preservation of local cultures and so on. 
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measures, are notoriously difficult to quantify - and thus it may 
not be possible for provincial governments to demonstrate that the 
purpose of a particular measure was to achieve a legitimate 
objective. At the very least, the existence of the provision means 
that provinces may decide to withdraw from measures which may 
have long-term benefits to the residents where those benefits are 
not identifiable and measurable in the short term. 
Fourth, the requirement that provinces must demonstrate that 
measures inconsistent with the agreement but which attempt to 
meet legitimate objectives are not more trade restrictive than is 
necessary will lead governments to adopt the least intrusive and 
perhaps relatively less effective measures. To use consumer 
protection legislation as an example, less intrusive regulatory 
measures - such as requirements for performance rather than 
design standards, insurance requirements and warnings or 
disclosure requirements rather than licensing or certification 
measures - may have significant adverse distributive conse- 
quences to particular groups of consumers and certainly present a 
risk of less effective regulatory impact than do the more intrusive 
regulatory instruments available to governments. 
Fifth, Article 806 which prohibits the application of residency 
requirements on individuals doing business within a province 
ignores the very real difficulty which consumers and regulators 
face in effectively controlling the activity of extra-provincial 
businesses. Those who favour provincial regulatory authority 
argue that provincial governments must be able to establish 
residency requirements on natural persons as a licensing or regis- 
tration condition. Consumers cannot be expected to pursue 
defendant suppliers outside provincial boundaries, and trade 
practice legislation and regulatory compliance sanctions in general 
are most effective when they are applied to individual defendants 
and not merely to their firms. 
The general requirement in Annex 405.1.7 of the Agreement 
that standards must be developed as performance or competence 
rather than as design standards will permit uncontrolled experi- 
mentation by industry which will be able to comply with regulatory 
standards at the lowest possible cost, but may use that freedom to 
design products or services which may simultaneously put the 
safety and health of consumers at risk. If performance standards 
are to be utilized, regulators must be able to assess the particular 
design selected by the industry to determine, ex ante, if that design 
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adequately addresses the risk at issue and to confirm that the 
design does not generate additional or different risks to consumer 
welfare. 
In the end, the provincialist argues that the citizens of provinces 
deserve at least the same degree of respect within inter-provincial 
trade agreements as do citizens of states in international trade 
agreements. National welfare must take second place to the 
welfare of local residents, pursued by provincial governments as 
their agents. Viewed through this lens, the Internal Trade 
Agreement goes much too far in demanding that provincial 
governments take into account the interests of firms acting in 
national or international markets, or in insisting that provincial 
regulatory authority be circumscribed in order to maximize 
aggregate national wealth and productivity. 
IV. WHY SUCH DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS? 
How then does one explain those very different stories? The 
search for the answer to this question takes one beyond the 
Agreement itself. To understand why both these stories can be 
told simultaneously, one is forced to confront one's conception of 
Canada and to understand what it means to be a Canadian. The 
answer to the question lies in a decade of fundamental changes in 
Canada's social, economic and political order during which our 
modern understanding of trade agreements was being shaped. 
These changes increased the need and desire for an internal trade 
agreement while simultaneously ensuring that severe and indeed 
intolerable limits would be placed on its scope and efficacy. 
The Canadian economic union represents only one particular 
component of the complex internal relationships which define us 
as Canadians. It is not possible to understand what has occurred to 
the Canadian economic union without moving beyond the 
extraordinarily complex, inter-connected exchange relations 
among economic factors which characterize market economies. 
The Canadian economic union is part of a social fabric which is 
comprised of a range of political sovereignties and allegiances 
associated with multiple jurisdictions in a federal state, the 
existence of strong regional cultural identities, diverse attitudes at 
the regional level towards the role of the Canadian state and social 
security, and conceptions of the role of Quebec in Canada. 
Several transforming events occurred during the decade since 
we started talking about internal trade.28 These events have 
z.8 I use the term "transforming" to describe fundamental, effectively irreversible changes 
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changed Canada permanently. They are largely responsible for 
the fact that we finally saw the federal and provincial governments 
enter into a trade agreement, and, paradoxically, for the fact that 
the trade agreement accomplished so little. These events have, 
sadly, worked together to create a nation which may be rapidly 
disintegrating around us. 
1. The Free Trade Agreements 
Canada entered into a Free Trade Agreement and then a North 
American Free Trade Agreement - first with the United States 
and then with the United States and Mexico. An intense debate 
occurred within Canada focusing on the winners and losers within 
Canada created by those trade agreements; on the appropriate 
transition strategies necessary to respond to changes in the 
Canadian economy associated with those agreements; on the 
impact on environmental, social and labour policies associated 
with competition in a North American market; on how Canadian 
cultural identity would be affected by open North American 
markets; and on the future we would face without those agree- 
ments. 
The trade agreements demonstrated to many (although 
certainly not to all) Canadians that freer trade could bring 
substantial economic benefits - and avoid more serious negative 
economic consequences - to Canadians. The international agree- 
ments made the federal government acutely aware that its success 
in future international negotiations and its ability to avoid 
challenges to the existing agreements would be jeopardized if it 
could not assure foreign nations of co-operation by the provinces. 
The Agreements also created a climate in which trade agreements 
were seen as part of the current popular political agendas of all 
main-stream parties. The existence of these agreements increased 
the likelihood of extra-national challenges to provincial as well as 
federal policies which, while they might be directed at internal 
trade issues, would be challengeable under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement and the Canada-United States Trade 
in the way in which Canada is governed and thus changes which define the Canadian 
political economy. In that sense, elections, treaties, constitutional reform and economic 
recessions, in so  far as they exact far-reaching and relatively permanent changes to 
Canada's social, economic and political order, are treated similarly. 
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Agreement as interfering with the flow of goods across interna- 
tional borders.29 All of these developments offered considerable 
support for those who argued for the development of an internal 
trade agreement among the provinces. 
At the same time, however, there can be little disagreement 
with the proposition that the two free trade agreements have 
brought Canadians much closer to the United States than we were 
a decade ago. In so far as we define ourselves in relation to others, 
the number and kinds of relations which comprise Canada have 
shifted from an EasttWest to a NorthISouth axis and toward 
nations beyond Canadian borders. Provincialists, from British 
Columbia, for example, will argue that there is, in truth, little 
need for a pan-Canadian trade agreement. British Columbia may 
now, and will certainly have in the future, stronger economic links 
with Asia and the western American States than it has to much of 
Canada. Firms in many provinces need effective trade agreements 
with the United States and Asian countries more than they need 
agreements with most Canadian provinces. Those extra-national 
jurisdictions have the technological expertise, populations and 
resource needs which Canadian firms cannot afford to ignore. 
With continued progress on World Trade Organization treaties 
and with the introduction of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement over 
the past decade, the need for a "Canadian" Free Trade 
Agreement has been significantly attenuated. 
Canada's participation in two international trade agreements 
thus had a two-edged impact on internal trade strategies. It 
offered support to those who favoured trade agreements in 
principle and evidence to some that trade agreements could work 
to the benefit of participating states; but the international agree- 
ments simultaneously reduced the interest of, and need for, many 
Canadian businesses to look to trading partners within other 
regions of Canada and thus offered support for those who would 
retain strong provincial barriers within the umbrella of the 
rhetoric of free trade in the Internal Trade Agreement. Put 
simply, the sequencing of the international and internal trade 
agreements was wrong. 
29 See Robson, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 72-4. 
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2. The Constitutional Crisis 
Canadians have lived through a decade of constitutional crises 
as the Canadian constitution was patriated; as the Meech Lake 
Accord was developed and then failed; and as the Charlottetown 
constitutional accord was negotiated and then soundly rejected by 
Canadians in a national referendum. The failure to bring Quebec 
into the Canadian constitutional family through constitutional 
reform has led to measures, including the Internal Trade 
Agreement, which are presented as efforts to bring Quebec into 
Canada, albeit as part of an economic compact rather than 
through a constitutional acc0rd.3~ 
However, while the constitutional agenda might explain the 
existence of the Internal Trade Agreement, the Charlottetown 
Accord, in particular, was an extraordinarily decentralizing 
document. While some participants would have wanted more, 
even the consensus reached was a product of the federal 
government agreeing to what would have been an extraordinary 
degree of provincial authority and autonomy within a loose 
political arrangement called Canada. While the accord failed the 
test of a national referendum in most parts of Canada, the under- 
lying governmental politics which it reflected remain extant. 
Provincial governments (and I might add, First Nations commu- 
nities) were emboldened by their success in securing the 
agreement of the federal government to transfer political 
authority to both groups. That transfer can and has taken place 
through the incremental withdrawal of a federal government 
presence in national broadcasting, by reductions in federal 
funding of and responsibility for social and educational programs, 
in the optional transfer to provinces of primary control over 
immigration, and among other areas of economic and social 
activity. The result is that the provinces were able to exercise 
considerable leverage in shaping the Internal Trade Agreement to 
ensure continued provincial autonomy and sovereignty over 
significant components of the national economy. 
It is widely known that the existence and certainly the timing of the Internal Trade 
Agreement were directly related to the then forthcoming provincial election in Quebec. 
The Agreement was negotiated with the hope that support for a separatist government 
might be reduced if the then Liberal Quebec government could point to the direct 
economic benefits of a renewed economic federalism represented by the Internal Trade 
Agreement. It is impossible to know if that strategy succeeded in fact. It did not, we 
know, result in the defeat of the challenge presented by a separatist government. 
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Again, the connection between the Internal Trade Agreement 
and Quebec independence made the existence of an Agreement 
inevitable, but simultaneously assured that it could riot accomplish 
the national economic integrative agenda which would have been 
expected in a trade agreement. Certainly, while the Internal Trade 
Agreement had to be perceived as bringing Quebec into Canada, 
it could not interfere with Quebec cultural autonomy and 
authority to address provincial social policy issues. Meanwhile few 
provinces would agree to a "distinct economic status" for Quebec 
in the Internal Trade Agreement, any more than they could agree, 
given the referendum, to distinct political status for Quebec in a 
constitutional document. 
The Internal Trade Agreement confirms what many suspect - 
that we have closer relations both with those who live outside of 
our national borders, as well as those who live within our own 
respective provincial borders than we do with those who live 
within other provinces inside Canada's borders. In so far as we 
define ourselves in relation to others, the increasingly effective 
political autonomy and authority of the provinces has meant that 
the number and kinds of relations which comprise Canada have 
shifted from a trans-provincial East/West axis to a number of 
intra-provincial and inter-national axes. It is remarkable how 
many Canadians, especially in the West, have developed a psycho- 
logical distance from the rest of Canada - they see themselves as 
part of a new Pacific Rim economic regional arrangement, as part 
of a "northwestamerican" culture as much as they see themselves 
as part of Canada. The result is that while provinces would enter 
into a trade agreement, they would not agree to forgo the real 
political power acquired during the past decade. 
3. The Transformation of the Canadian State 
The past decade has seen a quite extraordinary transformation 
of the way in which individual Canadians conceive of the role of 
the modern Canadian federal state. The end of the decade brought 
with it a recession which was not only the deepest and broadest in 
50 years, but which left Canada with unemployment levels among 
the highest in the developed world. This recession for the first time 
struck at the manufacturing base of Central Canada, and finally 
made ordinary Canadians recognize the importance of responding 
to concerns about regulatory costs, productivity and economic 
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growth if we were to remain independent as a nation. The social 
and economic costs of the recession perhaps persuaded ordinary 
Canadians, as well as their political representatives, of the 
pressing need to deal with the regulatory costs associated with 
internal trade barriers between provinces. 
At the same time significantly higher personal income taxes in 
Canada - as compared to those paid by citizens of the United 
States, our most obvious companion - and a highly visible 
national sales tax have significantly reduced the ability of the 
federal as well as provincial governments to engage in new social 
programs. They have combined to create palpable animosity, 
towards governments in general and the federal government in 
particular. For much of the past decade Canada was led by an 
extraordinarily unpopular government and Prime Minister, 
resulting, in the most recent federal election, in the virtual elimi- 
nation at the federal level. Of one of Canada's oldest and most 
powerful political parties. The disappearance of a national party in 
Canada occurred as two regional parties experienced meteoric 
ascendencies and captured substantial numbers of seats in Quebec 
and Western Canada. If anything, regionalism within federal 
politics exacerbated the provinces' distrust of federal institutions 
and magnified provincial concerns that they must be able to antic- 
ipate and react to federal regional redistributive policies through 
the establishment of protectionist trade barriers and other 
measures. 
It seems to me that the provinces, in general, distrust assurances 
that they will receive a fair share of national wealth if they leave 
regional redistribution to the federal government. That final point 
cannot be made too strongly. Provincial trade policy is driven not 
only indirectly by provincial social policy agendas, but also 
directly by provincial interests in addressing the distributive 
impacts of national markets. The issue of federalism and equity - 
the redistribution of the benefits of the market among Canadian 
regions - lies at the heart of the dilemma which the Trade 
Agreement presents. Ideals of economic equality among 
Canadians, and very real concerns with debilitating tax and expen- 
diture competition among provinces, suggests that equity policies 
should be addressed federally. However, it seems to me that, in 
recent years at least, provincial protectionist measures are most 
sensibly explained as efforts which are directed at ensuring that 
particular regions receive what they believe is a deserved share of 
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economic wealth generated within a national economy. According 
to the provinces, too much of our history consists of federal 
government policies - so called "equity judgments" -which are 
directed at moving disproportionate shares of national wealth to 
particular regions, whether for the most compassionate or basest 
of motives.31 
By assuming regulatory authority over specific economic activ- 
ities and by using trade barriers to direct economic benefits 
directly to firms acting within their borders, provinces assure that 
the benefits of those policies flow to and are captured directly by 
their citizens. The fact that aggregate economic activity at the 
national level may be reduced as a result of the fragmentation of 
markets, increased compliance costs, duplication of provincial 
policies and program delivery, and elimination of economies of 
scale associated with federal government program delivery, is 
ignored as provinces compete through protectionist provincial 
policies for a larger proportional share of a smaller pie. 
Moreover, provincial and federal deficits grew enormously 
throughout the decade, resulting in a substantial portion of tax 
dollars having to be redirected to debt repayment and a 
withdrawal of federal government resources from the provinces. 
Both of these developments meant a visible diminution of the role 
of the Canadian state in social policy. A trade agreement, to the 
degree that it is effective, undoubtedly restricts governments in 
pursuing interventionist social policies. The trade agreement that 
now defines the Canadian economic union, to the extent that it is 
effective, will have that effect. However, there are few govern- 
ments which have the resources or political will to pursue aggres- 
sively interventionist social policies at the federal or provincial 
level even if they had an interest in doing so. An internal trade 
agreement which preserves most historical trade barriers 
produced by existing social and economic policies represents 
minimal political costs to most provincial governments, given that 
they are unlikely to pursue aggressive social policy agendas in the 
near to mid-term future. Thus the diminution of the role of the 
state in Canada, in part associated with an economic crisis unpar- 
alleled in 50 years, provided support both for those who argued for 
the development of an internal trade agreement and for those who 
31 In fact, s. 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, now constitutionalizes a commitment to 
interregional equity, albeit unenforceable through legal processes. 
Heinonline - -  25  Can. Bus. L.J. 277 1995 
278 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 25 
knew that an agreement which merely froze barriers would cost 
provincial governments very little in forgone opportunities to 
achieve provincial social policy objectives. 
Finally, the past decade saw the introduction of a Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms which simultaneously shifted power away 
from representative institutions to the judiciary, transformed 
political and public dialogue into legal and curial litigation and 
contributed to an emerging Canadian identity as a community of 
individuals exercising rights to ensure that we are protected from 
each other. The meaning of Canada as a pan-continental 
community subject to peace order and good government has been 
transformed to a sense of Canadians as individuals protected from 
that same government by personal rights as we pursue self-defined 
goals unconstrained by the state. The individualization of the 
Canadian identity is consistent with an internal trade agreement 
which focuses on economic growth at the expense of provinces' 
abilities to pursue social policies. At the same time, however, the 
diminution in the role of the state associated with the Charter 
made it difficult for the federal government to act forcefully in an 
effort to reduce trade barriers at the provincial level. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thus the past decade during which the very public dialogue 
about the Canadian economic union took place was, at the same 
time, a decade which saw Canada and its citizens balkanized, 
turned on its axis towards the south, individualized and trans- 
formed into a nation of distrustful cynics toward the role of the 
Canadian state and, in particular, toward the place of the federal 
government's role in establishing and preserving "internal" 
national relationships and institutions. 
It has been argued that the fragmentation of markets, dupli- 
cation in program delivery, excessive enforcement and 
compliance costs associated with federalism could, in theory, be 
overcome by ex post negotiation between provinces. With few 
exceptions, these negotiations, perhaps because they are so 
visible, or perhaps because the losses to well-organized producer 
interests would be so visible and highly focused, may not occur. 
The Internal Trade Agreement, in so far as it represents what one 
could expect from ex post negotiations, confirms that voluntary 
agreement designed to adjust to the costs of federalism do not, in 
reality, offer Canadians very much at all. 
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The gaps, exclusions and overall weakness of the Internal Trade 
Agreement - at least when compared to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement - are a product of the historically and 
increasingly decentralized nature of Canadian federalism, the 
practical and political inability of the federal government to use its 
legal authority to act unilaterally to create a common market in 
Canada, and the need to offer substantial benefits to all 10 
provinces in a multi-lateral bargaining process. Moreover, the 
palpable distrust of the federal government which has developed 
in recent years,32 the mutual distrust of other provinces and an 
economic lens which is now focused outside of Canada, all confirm 
the rapidly disintegrating relations among some provinces and 
among many ordinary Canadians, as the national economy, like 
other national institutions, fails to receive the support it requires. 
Put most bluntly, too many provincialists believe, either as 
politicians, producers or consumers (but, in my view, mostly as 
provincial politicians) that they will be better off if they can 
exercise power at the provincial, regional or even local level. In an 
era of globalization, of rapidly transforming international market- 
places for goods, services and credit, and of increased mobility of 
capital and labour even within Canada, I do not fully understand 
how Canada as a society will be better off if regulatory authority is 
exercised in Regina or Winnipeg, Edmonton or Halifax rather 
than Ottawa. Most remarkable and disconcerting of all is that the 
Canadian Internal Trade Agreement, an intra-national agreement 
supposedly representing the collective interests of all Canadians, 
should look so much like, but which perhaps accomplishes so 
much less than, the North American Free Trade Agreement - an 
international agreement between three sovereign nations 
motivated only by national self-interest. 
32 See E. H. Fry, "The Role of State and Federal Governments in Canada-U.S. Sectoral 
Integration" (1985), 10 Can.-U.S. L. J. 169 at pp. 176-82. 
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